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Abstract  
This paper examines the potential impact of governance mechanisms (top management team 
structure and board composition) on post-IPO performance of young Australian firms from 
2002-2007. We find that change in board of directors and TMT membership significantly 
affects firm performance. The higher proportion of the IPO original board remains, the better 
performance. An analogous relationship between the proportion of original TMT members 
and firm performance is also documented. Our study reveals that both original TMT and 
board members have a significant effect on both short-term and long-term IPO performance. 
We conclude that the retention of both the original directors and TMT members is favorable 
to young IPO firms and their post-IPO performance.  
JEL classification: G30, G32, L25 
Keywords 
Corporate governance; board composition; top management teams; young firms; post-IPO 
performance. 
                                                          
 We thank Dr. Jing Tian, Dr. Paul Blacklow, Dinesh Gajural; and seminar participants at University of 
Tasmania for many helpful comments and suggestions. 
 Corresponding author. Email: biplob.chowdhury@utas.edu.au  (B.Chowdhury) 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the impact of post-IPO changes in corporate governance mechanisms 
on firm performance as they are transforming themselves from private domain to public 
domain through initial public offerings (IPO). Most of the existing empirical work addresses 
post-IPO performance with respect to corporate governance issues excluding young firms 
from the sample.
1
 As a result, we know relatively little about the performance of young firms 
following IPO. Baker and Gompers (2003) note that evaluating the effectiveness of  corporate 
governance structures is more important around corporate events such as an IPO rather than 
in calendar time, since governance structures in calendar time are as much a consequence of 
past performance as they are measures of good quality of corporate governance. Further, they 
add that the establishment of effective governance structures is crucially important at the time 
of IPO since it represents the first time that most firms raise capital from potential investors. 
Since the choice of organizational form is a central part of governance design, it is important 
to evaluate the impact of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
of newly public firms. Therefore, this study considers the post IPO- context for young firms.
2
 
Post- IPO firms are unique because they are still at a vulnerable stage of their development 
process and face transitional challenges stemming from their inexperience with market 
mechanisms. As a consequence of going public, firms go through radical changes in their 
corporate governance mechanisms, many of which involve corporate governance- related 
processes (Burton, Helliar, & Power, 2004). Transition to the public domain is required to 
adjust firms’ post-IPO structures and strategies, such as the separation of ownership and 
                                                          
1
See, for example Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006);Yermack (1996). Some 
exceptions are Kroll, Walters, and Son (2007); Walters, Kroll, and Wright (2010). 
2
IPO activities have increased significantly in recent past (i.e. 1998-2007). The US firms raised capital of over 
$600 billion through IPO (about 3,000 IPOs) between 1998 and 2007 (Certo, Holcomb, & Holmes, 2009). The 
majorities of firms are not large companies (Kroll et al., 2007). Additionally, in 2009, Australia raised capital of 
US$86.2 billion through the IPOs (Chancharat, Krishnamurti, & Tian, 2012). 
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control and the need for additional resources to compete in rapidly evolving industries and 
product markets (Bouresli, Davidson, & Abdulsalam, 2002). An IPO firm’s success is 
therefore crucially dependent on the ability, motivation, skills, incentives, and risk taking 
ability of its original board members and top management teams (TMT) as they attempt to 
carry the firm toward the IPO stage successfully. After going public, signaling theory 
suggests that, promising companies will attract investors and those new owners may be 
willing to intervene in two of the most crucial corporate governance mechanisms: board 
composition and TMT structure. The board and executives are two important components of 
the strategic decision making of the firm and thus owners want to assure that these agents will 
act in their interests and take wealth-maximizing decisions (Certo, 2003; Sanders & Boivie, 
2004).  
Research provides arguments to support the governance changes that take place following 
IPOs and their effect on post-IPO performance. For instance, in a study of the post-IPO 
performance of young entrepreneurial firms, Kroll et al. (2007) provide empirical support for 
the view that outside directors are less effective when firms are facing transitional challenges 
from private domain to public domain. In fact, they recommend that a majority of board 
members be insiders. Most of the existing empirical studies, however, have relied primarily 
on agency theory (Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003), and suggest that boards should be 
comprised largely of independent outside directors (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Wright, Kroll, & 
Elenkov, 2002). Agency theorists assert that outside board members are essential, otherwise 
the separation of ownership and control may provide opportunities for agents (managers) to 
act in their own self-interest by maximizing their own wealth and power at the expense of the 
owners (Lynall et al., 2003). Therefore, radical changes in post-IPO corporate governance 
mechanisms, such as board monitoring help to reduce agency costs, increase legitimacy and 
thus improve firm performance. On the other hand, rapid change in post-IPO corporate 
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governance may hamper firm performance. Barney (1991) argues that radical change in post-
IPO corporate governance may fail to influence the human and social capital of the original 
TMT, and diminishes their psychological commitment, resulting in lower performance. These 
changes in post-IPO corporate governance may have conflicting effects on firm performance.  
Amongst different governance mechanisms in young firms, the board and TMT play a vital 
role in achieving effective governance. Young firms greatly depend on their original top 
managers and board members as they are less likely to attract independent board members 
and top management teams with sufficient experience and expertise to perform effectively 
when compared with mature and established firms. In addition, young firms’ competitive 
advantages tend to come from the human and social capital of their top managers such as 
their entrepreneurial skills, higher ownership stakes, social connections and high level of 
psychological motivation and effort. Radically imposing independent corporate governance 
mechanisms on a firm following IPO may negatively affect its TMT motivation and stability 
ultimately leading to some detrimental effects for firm performance. Jain and Kini (1994) 
find that firms going public demonstrate a substantial decline in operating performance 
subsequent to the IPO; see also Daily and Dalton (1995) and Bergh (2001). In addition, Kroll 
et al. (2007) argue that the conventional corporate governance mechanisms may be more 
effective for large and well established organizations, but might not be appropriate for young 
firms following the IPO process because the nature and size of agency costs are different. 
Young firms face radical changes during the IPO-period called the ‘liability of newness’ 
(Stinchcombe, 1965) and may warrant different approaches compared with large 
corporations.  
We focus our analysis on changes in corporate governance mechanisms that take place 
following IPOs and their effect on post IPO performance for firms with limited histories (i.e. 
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young firms). In particular, we ask the following questions. First, how the changes in top 
management team composition after IPO affect the firm operating performance. Second, how 
changes in board structure affect the firm’s subsequent performance.  
We consider a sample of 40 young Australian firms that followed the IPO process in 2001 
and their performance between 2002- 2007. For each firm, we hand-collect board, TMT and 
firm characteristics information for the year of IPO and each of years 1 to 6 following the 
IPO. We collect the information on performance variables for the same period. After 
controlling for firm characteristics, and time effects, we present evidence indicating that 
retention of the original board and TMT leads to better performance. This result is 
statistically significant and quite robust in our sample. Hence, the evidence is consistent with 
the hypothesis that both the original directors and executives are needed for better post-IPO 
performance (Kor, 2003; Kroll et al., 2007). Agency theorists (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 
1976) assert that presence of board vigilance is required for better performance, however, 
Kroll et al. (2007) and Walters et al. (2010) provide evidence that agency prescription may 
not be applicable for young firms. The resource-based view states that losing executives with 
TMT firm-specific human capital may hurt firm performance because their human capital 
represents a critical source of competitive advantage. Our results support the resource-based 
prediction and contribute additional detail to the explanation of the effect of TMT human 
capital on performance (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Kroll et al., 2007; Walters et al., 2010). In 
general, our result is also consistent with Easterwood, İnce, and Raheja (2012) who find 
evidence that the firms with no board turnover have the largest performance improvement 
using a sample of non-IPO firms that experienced a negative performance shock.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in finance and organizational theory in several ways. 
First, we provide evidence that the traditional approach adopted by shareholders to appoint 
6 
 
their agents may not be applicable for young firms. Second, we document the effect of 
changes in board structures and top management team of young firms on firm performance. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the impact of changes in 
corporate governance structure on post-IPO performance in the context of Australian young 
firms. Although, there is a significant amount of work in the Australian setting on post-IPO 
firm performance (Balatbat, Taylor, & Walter, 2004; Lee, Taylor, & Walter, 1996), there is 
no systematic evidence of which we are aware that examines operating performance 
measures following young IPO firms. Australia presents an interesting case; Australia shares 
the English common-law legal system with the US and UK, and has the open market policies 
consistent with the US. Differences in financial developments, the mechanisms and 
effectiveness of young firms, means that governance could be quite different in Australia, 
although the governance reforms in Australia borrow concepts and “best practices” from the 
US. In 2009, Australia raised capital of US$86.2 billion (third largest in the world in terms of 
investment flow) through IPOs and issuing secondary shares (Chancharat et al., 2012).  
Finally, Our paper complements the recent study of Kroll et al. (2007) who study the impact 
of board composition on post-IPO performance of US young firms over a two year period. 
We extend the previous studies that focus on US young firms to an international scenario. To 
the best of our knowledge, the sample period in this study is considerably larger than the 
sample period in previous studies. In addition, we use panel data techniques, which enable us 
to isolate both cross-section and time-series effects and also look at firm performance for 
longer term rather than their short-term period (2-years post IPO-performance). We are 
interested in long-term performance given the fact that most of the young firms are either 
merged with other firms or do not survive after the initial periods of IPO. Hence, it is 
important to measure the long-term performance of young firms to capture the true effect of 
changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
on firm corporate governance and develops testable hypotheses. We discuss our sample, the 
variables used in the analysis and methodology in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results on 
the impact of changes in governance mechanisms on firm outcomes. Section 5 provides some 
robustness tests and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
In the context of IPO firms, the literature suggest that firms undergo changes to make the 
transition to public firms and as a consequence, changes in the ownership structure might be 
followed by changes in corporate governance mechanisms. For instance, Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin (1997) report that the presence of new outside blockholders leads to executive turnover. 
This is simply the result of combating the agency problem, that is, the conflict of interest 
arising in the relationship due to the divergence of managers (assumed rational but 
opportunistic) from the shareholder interest. The blockholders are likely to appoint their 
agents to the TMT or the board of directors to look after their interests, a phenomenon 
confirmed by Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) and Kahn and Winton (1998). The 
question we examine is how the changes in governance mechanisms affect subsequent 
performance.  
When initiating the IPO process, firms are likely to pay special attention to the composition 
of their TMT to clearly signal to potential investors. The functional and educational 
backgrounds of the TMT are seen as critical factors which may attract a higher amount of 
capital during the IPO. A TMT which clearly demonstrates its strength in managing the 
business is a lucrative investment opportunity for investors. Moreover, for young firms, 
executives or members of TMT who have extensive knowledge and experience with the firm 
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are a potential source of competitive advantage (Kor, 2003). These TMT members are the 
ones who brought the firm to the IPO stage.  
Young firms have organic growth until IPO stage (Kroll et al., 2007) and the original TMT 
members are the masterminds who make it happen. Small firms are mostly dependent on the 
knowledge base available within them. When new blockholders come into the scene, they 
want changes in the TMT structure because they want their agents to look after their interest. 
As a result, some of the original TMT members who have extensive firm specific knowledge 
will probably need to leave while their positions will be taken by the agents of the new 
blockholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). We argue that by letting original members of the TMT 
depart, post-IPO firms lose an important competitive edge which will lead to a lower 
operating performance in the following years. Existing research also suggests that post-IPO 
success is enhanced with more cohesive management teams with the original TMT in place 
(Fischer & Pollock, 2004; Kroll et al., 2007).Therefore, we expect to observe a positive 
relationship between the proportion of original TMT members and firm performance during 
the post IPO stage.  
The theoretical literature in corporate governance suggests that not only changes in TMT 
composition have an impact on post-IPO performance but also other organizational 
leadership, such as the directors should be considered (Certo, Holmes Jr, & Holcomb, 2007). 
For example, Coles et al. (2008) argue that firms, for which insider firm-specific knowledge 
is comparatively crucial, will be better off with a greater proportion of insiders on the board. 
A firm’s corporate governance plays a vital part in creating value for shareholders. Firms that 
are about to initiate an IPO process will gain from having a proper board structure involving a 
mix of both inside and outside directors whose prestige adds to that of their founders. The 
results also underline the importance that founders’ experiences and ownership position play 
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in appointing the board of directors (Chahine, Filatotchev, & Zahra, 2011). New investors’ 
demands to see changes in the board structure are contradictory after their decision to invest 
in the firm in the first place based on being impressed by the original board of directors.  
Beatty and Zajac (1994) find that, the traditional board independence recommendation of 
agency theory is not as important in the IPO context. In addition to retaining the original 
executives, it is also important to retain directors. If the tacit knowledge and shared vision of 
the TMT is a source of competitive advantage, then the board that has been contributing to 
the firm from its inception through appropriate monitoring and participating in the strategic 
decision making process, is also a source of competitive advantage. Scholars already consider 
directors to be a reflection of the owners and suggest that, for better performance in smaller 
firms, strategic decision making needs to be done by the same individuals (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Walters et al., 2010). Certo et al. (2007) talk of a dominant coalition composed of the 
strategic leaders, and that this coalition is likely to take the firm further with a shared vision 
(Nelson, 2003). From the above discussion, our second hypothesis is that there is a 
relationship between the proportion of original board members and firm performance, which 
is likely to be positive, although the direction is a matter to be tested.  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
Our initial sample consists of an unbalanced panel of firms that went public in Australia 
during 2001. Data on these firms are sourced from the OSIRIS database for the period of 
2001-2007. We focus on that time frame in order to avoid the impact of the exogenous event 
of the release of ASX Best Practice Recommendation in 2003 and also to avoid potential 
stock market fluctuations during the period of 2000 in the US. The observation period of our 
sample is six years after the date of issue. We choose the time window of six years in order to 
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consider the effect of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance 
beyond the immediate period. Following other studies, we consider young firms that are 
founded within the previous ten-year period and independently operated (i.e. firms that not 
spin-off or subsidiaries of other firms) (Daily & Dalton, 1995; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Kroll et al., 2007; Walters et al., 2010). To ensure that all firms were still in their 
young entrepreneurial stage, IPO firms founded from 1991 onwards only are included in this 
study. 
IPO prospectuses were obtained from the OSIRIS database. Prospectus information that 
contain detailed ownership and corporate governance data are collected manually through 
annual reports published in OSIRIS and cross-checked with annual reports and prospectus 
using Aspect Financial Analysis and the Morningstar DatAnalysis database. Financial data to 
compute Return on Assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, and measures of firm risk are obtained from 
the DataStream database. The governance data and performance data are merged for each 
company from 2001-2007. Firms which are delisted, acquired or merged within the sample 
period are excluded. We also exclude firms for which we could not find the relevant 
prospectus. These restrictions result in a final sample to 40 companies, equivalent to-240 
observations.  
3.2. Variable description 
In this section, we discuss the data sources for performance variables, governance variables 
and control variables.  
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Table 1. Variables, descriptions, and sources. 
This table provides descriptions of variables used in this paper. The sample consists of all young firms from 2002-2007. It 
also shows the years for which we have data available and total number of observations we have for each variable. 
Variables Definition 
Years 
available 
Sample 
size Data source 
Panel A. Performance Variables         
Firm Performance Return on Assets (ROA)= Earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization/Total assets 
2002-2007 240 Datastream 
  Tobin 's Q = Total assets+ market value of 
equity- book value of equity/ Total assets 
2002-2007 240 Datastream 
Panel B. Governance characteristics       
Change in  TMT membership Proportion of original TMT members t = 
no of original TMT t / no of TMT t 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
Change in board membership Proportion of original board members t =  
number of original directors t / number of 
directors t 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
TMT size Top management team members are those 
included in the top executives list of the 
corporate structures as reported on the 
corresponding documents 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
Board size The number of executive and non-
executive directors on the board 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
% of non-executive directors The percentage of non-executive directors 
on the board 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
CEO Duality A dummy variable that equals one if the 
chairman of the board is also the CEO of a 
firm and zero otherwise 
2002-2007 240 Annual reports 
Director age Average age of board members 2002-2007 154 Annual reports 
Panel C. Firm characteristics         
Firm Size Natural log of total assets 2002-2007 240 Datastream 
Dividend payout ratio The annual dividends per share divided by 
the Earrings per share 
2002-2007 240 Datastream 
Leverage Ratio  Total liabilities  over total assets 2002-2007 240 Datastream 
Firm risk Standard deviation of previous 12 month 
stock returns. 
2002-2007 235 Datastream 
Year dummies We include year dummies       
 
3.2.1. Performance variables 
Both stock market-based and accounting-based performance measures are used in the 
literature. In this study, ROA is employed as an accounting-based performance and Tobin’s 
Q as a stock market based performance measure. In terms of post-IPO performance, we use 
the ROA, obtained by the ratio of ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization (EBITDA) on book value of assets, as used in previous corporate governance 
research (Coles et al., 2008). We focus on EBITDA, rather than net income, as EBITDA is 
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good means of comparing companies within and across industries. We use the accounting 
measure ROA as a primary performance measure following Bhagat and Bolton (2008), who 
assert that stock market based performance measures are susceptible to investor expectations. 
If investors anticipate the corporate governance effect on performance, long-term stock 
returns will not be significantly correlated with governance, even if a significant correlation 
between performance and governance in fact exists. Further, abnormal operating performance 
should be largely exogenous with respect to subsequent governance changes.
3
 Moreover, 
Wintoki et al. (2012) emphasize that Tobin’s Q is a proxy for growth opportunities and the 
growth opportunities are a cause rather than a consequence of governance structures.  
For comparison, we also use Tobin’s Q as the market based measure of performance in order 
to capture different aspects of firm performance and to aid the comparison our results with 
the extant literature (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; King & Santor, 
2008). In line with Coles et al. (2008) and Adams and Ferreira (2009), we define Tobin’s Q 
as book value of assets minus book equity plus market value of equity all divided by book 
value of assets.  
3.2.2. Measuring Change in Governance Mechanisms 
We describe our primary measures of TMT membership and board membership, as well as 
changes in this measure. 
Change in TMT membership. In line with the existing literature, we define the top 
management team (TMT) as a team comprising of Chairperson of the board (COB), Vice 
chairperson (VC), Chief Executive Officer (CEO), President, Chief Operating Officer (COO), 
Senior Vice President (SVP), Executive Vice President (EVP) (Murray, 1989; Tihanyi, 
Ellstrand, Daily, & Dalton, 2000). Top management team members are those included in the 
                                                          
3
See Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) for more on endogeneity problems in corporate governance research. 
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top executives list of the corporate structures as reported in the corresponding documents – 
Company Annual Reports (Cohen & Dean, 2005). Our measure of the change in TMT 
membership is calculated as the number of original TMT members divided by the current 
year number of TMT members. 
Change in board membership. We define Board Size as the number of executive and non-
executive directors on the board. In line with ASX Best Practice Recommendation, the Board 
comprises a non-executive chairperson, at least one non-executive director and one executive 
director; additionally a majority of the board should be independent directors (who do not 
have any material relationship with the company) (Council & Exchange, 2007). If the person 
is listed as a director then he or she is considered as a member of the board. We determine the 
change in board membership by looking at the prospectus and proxy statements. Our measure 
of the change in board membership is calculated as the number of original directors divided 
by the current year number of directors. Consistent with TMT membership, these data are 
collected for the IPO date and the six years following the IPO date.  
3.2.3. Control Variables 
Our analysis includes several control variables that potentially affect firm performance. With 
reference to the board and TMT characteristics, we include the following control variables: 
TMT size, board size, director age, CEO duality and non-executive director ratio. 
Following previous studies, the number of executives and directors are used to account for 
possible effects for TMT and board size on firm performance (Coles et al., 2008; Walters et 
al., 2010).  Previous researchers provide evidence that demographic variables such as TMT 
and director age impact firm performance (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Higgins & Gulati, 2006). In 
line with Francis, Hasan, and Wu (2012), we include director age which may be considered 
as an indicator of the knowledge, experience, wisdom and established networks. Rechner and 
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Dalton (1991) recommend the separation of chairman and chief executive positions while 
some scholars support the notion that duality is beneficial for firm performance (Braun & 
Sharma, 2007). Findings about duality are subject to debate (Desai, Kroll, & Wright, 2003). 
In this study, CEO duality is adopt as a dummy variable that equals one if the chairman of the 
board is also the CEO of a firm and zero otherwise. We adopt the proportion of non-
executive directors to the number of directors on the board as a proxy for board 
independence. Empirical evidence suggests that the relationship between performance and 
board composition is mixed (Bhagat & Black, 2001; Coles et al., 2008; Yermack, 1996).We 
assume that non-executive directors’ play a monitoring role on top management of the firm 
and thus predict a negative impact of non-executive director ratio on firm value. 
With reference to firm characteristics, we include the following variables; firm size, dividend 
payout ratio, leverage and firm risk. Previous research suggests that firm size may be related 
to firm performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006); we employ the natural log of assets to control 
for firm size (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Bhagat & Bolton, 2008).We assume a positive 
association of dividend payout ratio with corporate value as we expect management to use 
dividends as a signal of performance to shareholders (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2001; Lopez de 
Silanes, Vishny, & Shleifer, 2000). Previous researchers provide inconclusive evidence 
regarding the effect of debt on firm value (G. R. Jensen, Solberg, & Zorn, 1992; McConnell 
& Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1989). According to pecking order theory, we 
hypothesis a negative relationship between a firm’s debt level (Leverage) and performance 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) where Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets. In addition, we include firm risk calculated as a standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns. We include year dummies in all regressions. Table 1 presents the sources and 
definitions of all variables. 
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3.3. Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics about firm performance and other characteristics of 
sample firms in the post-IPO period. Striking differences exist in both accounting and market 
return performance of young firms. The performance variable in panel A of Table 2 shows 
that the median of ROA is -0.17 implying that firms demonstrate a substantial negative 
performance. However, it can be seen that the median of Tobin’s Q is greater than 1 for the 
sample firms.  
The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 2 reveals the governance characteristics 
variables. Australia represents an interesting case study in many aspects. The average rate of 
change in board membership and TMT membership is 56% and 54% respectively. These 
results suggest that over 50% of the original directors and TMT members depart the board 
during the post-IPO stage. The average TMT size of Australian young firms is approximately 
three, while Carpenter, Pollock, and Leary (2003) report that the average TMT size for young 
firms in USA is six executives. Similar to other jurisdictions, the average board size is 4, 
which is consistent with previous studies in Australia (Chancharat et al., 2012). Australia has 
a high proportion of outside directors (63%), while, the percentage of non-executive director 
in the UK and US firms ranges between 50% and 67% (De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; 
Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). On average, 26% of Australian young firms have employed 
a dual role for both chairperson and president of the board. On average, the director age of 
Australian IPO firms is 50. The mean dividend payout ratio and the mean leverage ratio is 
16.47% and 39% respectively.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the sample firms for the entire sample period of 2002-2007. 
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. The sample consists of 240 observations from 
40 young firms in Australia, available from the OSIRIS database from 2002-2007. Prospectus information that contain 
ownership data and corporate governance data are collected manually through annual reports published in OSIRIS. The 
necessary financial data to compute Return on assets (ROA), Tobin’s Q, are obtained from DataStream. Sample data are not 
available for all firms for all years because of missing data (primarily due to missing proxy statements). See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. 
Variables Mean Median Std dev Min Max 
25th 
percentile 
75th 
percentile 
Panel A. Performance Variables 
       Return on assets -0.43 -0.17 0.96 -4.78 0.68 -0.54 0.06 
Tobin's Q 4.51 2.42 6.26 0.23 35.79 1.56 4.74 
Panel B. Governance characteristics 
       Change in TMT membership 0.56 0.61 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.81 
Change in board membership 0.54 0.50 0.25 0.03 1.00 0.38 0.74 
TMT Size 2.26 2.33 0.59 1.00 3.17 2.00 2.58 
Board size 4.45 4.25 0.77 3.50 6.50 3.83 5.00 
% of non-executive directors on the board 0.63 0.67 0.12 0.43 0.86 0.55 0.72 
CEO duality 0.26 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 
Director age 50.28 48.29 5.17 43.00 63.00 46.76 53.33 
Panel C. Firm characteristics 
       Firm size (Ln assets) 9.39 9.55 1.29 6.32 12.14 8.45 10.10 
Dividend payout ratio 16.47 0.00 31.78 0.00 98.66 0.00 6.11 
Leverage 0.39 0.24 0.52 0.02 3.08 0.12 0.49 
Firm risk 0.18 0.18 0.08 0.04 0.41 0.12 0.22 
Table 3 presents the difference in corporate governance variables over time for the sample 
firms. The mean of the change in TMT membership has decreased from 81% to 38% and the 
mean of the change in board membership has decreased from 79% to 37%. Board 
independence has increased from 60% to 66%. This trend reflects the introduction and 
gradual adoption of the Australian Stock Exchange’s Corporate Governance principles, 
which advocate the appointment of more independent directors.  
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Figure 1: Changes in corporate governance mechanisms during Post-IPO stage  
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that once investors become interested in these companies, 
some of these investors will acquire blockholder ownership in order to have sufficient power 
to influence the governance of the firm. As a consequence, following an IPO, companies may 
expect to see changes in their TMT structure and board composition and these significant 
change in TMT and board structure might reflect investor demand for their own interests.    
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the sample firm in 2002 and in 2007. 
  2002 2007 
Variables Mean Med. S.d. Min Max Mean Med. S.d. Min Max 
Governance characteristics                     
Change in TMT membership 0.81 1.00 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Change in board  membership 0.79 0.82 0.23 0.17 1.00 0.37 0.40 0.30 0.00 1.00 
TMT size 2.43 2.00 0.78 1.00 4.00 2.20 2.00 0.72 1.00 4.00 
Board size 4.60 4.00 1.17 3.00 8.00 4.53 4.50 1.15 3.00 8.00 
Non-executive directors ratio 0.60 0.60 0.19 0.25 1.00 0.66 0.67 0.13 0.40 1.00 
CEO duality 0.28 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Director age 47.96 47.50 6.35 38.00 61.25 52.68 51.17 5.31 44.67 64.30 
 
Figure 1 shows that the time trend of changes in governance mechanisms form 2002-2007. 
This figure illustrates the downward trend in both the average percentage of changes in TMT 
membership and the changes in board membership over time. This evidence suggests that, 
following IPO, firms face continuous changes in their TMT structure and board composition, 
which might be attributed to changes in shareholding compositions. 
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3.4. Methodology 
We examine the impact of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance subsequent to the IPO. In particular, we focus on how the changes in board 
composition and top management team structure affects the performance of young firms. We 
use the following model to examine the potential impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance. 
                    
    ∑                          
 
  ∑               
                                                   ( )  
where                     is either Return on assets (      ) or Tobin’s Q for company i, 
at time t; the   parameters capture the potential impacts of various governance mechanisms 
on firm performance;             comprises of size of top management team, board size, firm 
size, directors age, proportion of the non-executive director on the board, CEO duality, 
dividend pay ratio, leverage, firm risk and and       are independent error terms.  
We examine the relationship between performance and corporate governance variables using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). As we have panel data, the OLS result can be biased, through 
ignoring the panel structure of the data (Gujarati & Porter, 2009).We address this issue by 
controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity or omitted variable bias and employ the panel 
regression techniques with a random-effects regression model (King & Santor, 2008). Fixed 
effects are not appropriate in our case because most of the sample variation arises in the cross 
section instead of time series. In the random effects model, the variation across entities is 
assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the independent variables include in the model 
(Wooldridge, 2012). A Hausman test, confirms that a random effects model is better than the 
fixed effects model in dealing with the data. We address the possibility of bias in standard 
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errors issue by using clustered standard errors to account for residual dependence of the firm 
effect (Petersen, 2009).
4
 We use random effects panel regression for estimation and capture 
time effects with year dummies. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Effect of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on operating performance 
Table 4 presents OLS regression estimates of the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. The first three columns of results consider the role of 
changes in the original TMT and the final three columns include the role of changes in the 
original board.  In columns I and IV, we present the basic regression using only governance 
controls excluding director age. The specification used in columns II and V, includes the 
director age, and year dummies as well as other governance controls. In column III and VI, 
we include governance controls as well as firm specific controls in order to control the firm 
level-characteristics. This serves as a robustness check that our choice of control is not 
driving the results.  
An interesting related research question that arises is whether the unique aspects of top 
management team are particularly beneficial for young firms at the post-IPO stage. In the 
context of IPO, the corporate governance literature argues that TMT firm-specific human 
capital is an important source of competitive advantage because it is often tacit, context-
specific, and path-dependent, and thus valuable and inimitable. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
Due to small sample size, we do not have enough observations to construct 2-way cluster standard errors to 
account for both time-series and cross-sectional dependences. Therefore, we run OLS using the firm level 
clustered standard errors. 
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Table 4. Panel regression-Random effects of firm performance (ROA) on governance mechanisms plus 
controls. 
This table presents the results from Panel regression-Random effects between firm performance (ROA) and governance 
variables. The number of observations varies across the regressions due to data limitations (see Table 1). The sample 
consists of 240 observations from 40 young firms in Australia, available OSIRIS database from 2002-2007. See Table 1 for 
variable definitions. Robust Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. Year dummies are 
included but not shown. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable= ROA 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion of original TMT members 0.570* 0.398** 0.220* 
   
  (0.320) (0.172) (0.140)    
Proportion of original board members 
   
0.256 0.449* 0.368* 
     
(0.263) (0.313) (0.204) 
TMT size 0.257 0.010 0.032 0.217 0.002 0.043 
  (0.158) (0.129) (0.104) (0.158) (0.144) (0.112) 
Board size 0.190** 0.083 -0.013 0.177* 0.044 -0.053 
  (0.088) (0.059) (0.045) (0.093) (0.069) (0.050) 
Non-exc. directors ratio 0.251 -0.604 -0.332 0.085 -0.557 -0.255 
  (0.592) (0.489) (0.425) (0.571) (0.537) (0.430) 
CEO duality -0.044 0.256** 0.484*** -0.023 0.278** 0.511*** 
  (0.185) (0.111) (0.152) (0.183) (0.134) (0.149) 
Director age 
 
-0.002 -0.021* 
 
0.004 -0.019* 
   
(0.013) (0.011) 
 
(0.012) (0.011) 
Firm size (Ln assets) 
  
0.281*** 
  
0.283*** 
    
(0.058) 
  
(0.058) 
Dividend payout ratio 
  
0.002 
  
0.001 
    
(0.001) 
  
(0.002) 
Leverage 
  
-0.340 
  
-0.331 
    
(0.295) 
  
(0.277) 
Firm risk 
  
0.307 
  
0.141 
    
(0.534) 
  
(0.578) 
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes 
Cons -2.320** -0.751 -2.135*** -1.893* -0.915 -2.261*** 
  (1.140) (0.860) (0.777) (1.004) (0.892) (0.748) 
N 240 154 150 240 154 150 
Chi-squared 22.54 32.24 119.5 20.84 16.16 114.5 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.38 0.10 0.11 0.39 
See, Barney (1991); Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990); Reed, Lubatkin, and Srinivasan 
(2006). Since, young firms typically operate in a rapidly evolving and risky environment, 
retaining executives with firm specific human capital is crucial (Castanias & Helfat, 1991), as 
success in reaching the IPO milestone is largely attributable to these original TMTs (Kroll et 
al., 2007; Nelson, 2003; Zimmerman, 2008). Moreover, original TMT members are 
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characteristized by a higher need for achievement, strong psychological attachment to the 
company, greater power and influence within the organization, stronger economic ties, higher 
ownership stakes, longer investment horizons and higher degrees of firm specific skill 
relative to outside TMT members. Based on this line of research, we conjecture that a 
positive relationship exists between the proportion of original TMT members and firm 
performance in the post IPO period.  
Table 4, Columns I- III, present estimates from regressions of ROA on change in TMT 
membership, as well as control variables. Here, as an explanatory variable, we use the 
proportion of original TMT members in a given year as a proxy to capture the changes in 
TMT membership. The results suggest that change in TMT membership has a significantly 
positive relationship with ROA across columns I- III. For a young firm, this indicates that 
original TMTs have a positive influence on firm performance in the next five years period 
subsequent to the IPO process. We find new evidence that the proportion of original TMTs 
has a positive relationship with ROA over the post-IPO period for at least six years. 
As expected, we find that the coefficient of TMT size is positive, suggesting that a larger and 
more diverse management team is beneficial for young firms. The result is consistent with 
findings of Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) that large TMT size is more profitable in 
turbulent environments. Board size is statistically significant, in line with previous studies in 
the Australian context (Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Pham, Suchard, & Zein, 2011), but in 
contrast with international research (De Andres et al., 2005; Yermack, 1996). We suggest, 
from these results, that the increase in board size brought a variety of knowledge and linkages 
to support the top management in dealing effectively with the turbulent environment thus 
benefiting the firm. Firm size has a positive impact on performance, indicating that bigger 
firms have higher performance. King and Santor (2008) report that larger Canadian firms 
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have higher ROA. A significant positive relation between CEO duality and ROA, suggesting 
that CEO duality may be value enhancing for young firms. 
In order to evaluate the relationship between changes in board membership and performance, 
it is important to understand how the board membership of young firms differs from the 
board membership of established firms. In small firms, the role of the corporate board focuses 
on providing strategic advice; extending the network of the management; and mitigating 
conflict that arises from separation of ownership and controls. Further, board members of 
young firms may be more intrinsically motivated and derive nonmonetary as well as 
monetary benefits form working in their organizations (Wasserman, 2006). Consequently, 
they may have the psychological profiles of a steward and thus gain utility from fulfilling the 
purposes and objectives of the organization. The mutual gains resulting from this state of fit 
are high. Given board members' common commitment and corporate vision, granting them 
board seats facilitates the promotion of the strategic decision that they favour. Less 
monitoring from outside directors means they face fewer constraints in implementing 
strategies. Here, we expect a positive relationship between proportion of original board 
members and performance over the post-IPO period. To simplify the analysis of the 
relationship between firm performance and the changes in board membership, we use the 
proportion of original directors as the main independent variable. The proportion of original 
board members shows a positive relationship with ROA in columns V and VI of Table 4.  
The parameter estimates for the control variables are interesting. For example, we find that 
director age has a significant negative impact on operating performance. We interpret this 
result to mean that old directors may not catch up with new information and technology as 
easily as young directors, which may be important in dealing with unexpected and new 
problems during the turbulent environments. Neither the proportion of non-executive 
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directors nor dividend payout ratio are significant explanators of ROA. These results support 
the findings of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Hermalin and Weisbach (2001); Weir, Laing, and 
McKnight (2002). The results support the hypothesis that original board members have a 
positive influence on performance over the post-IPO period. 
Further, the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance appears to be, 
not only statistically significant, but also economically large. An increase in the proportion of 
original TMT members by 1% point is associated with an increase in ROA of 0.57% points. 
In addition, an increase in proportion of original board members by 1% point increases ROA 
by approximately 0.37% points.  
Overall, the OLS findings support the hypotheses that the original TMT members and 
original board of directors plays a significant role in Australian young firms. We find that the 
proportion of original TMT members and proportion of original board members have 
significantly positive impacts of firm performance in the post-IPO period. 
4.2. Effect of changes in corporate governance mechanisms on market performance 
In this section, we use the market based measure to assess firm performance. The results 
reported in Appendix Table 6 shows that when we use market based measures (Tobin’s Q), 
governance changes do not effect performance. Unlike the results with ROA, we do not find 
any noteworthy relationship between governance variables and Tobin’s Q. The lack of 
predictive power for Q is not surprising. In fact Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) claim that 
this is exactly as theory predicts: accounting measures of performance reflect the 
characteristics of current managers, while stock market based measures of performance 
should also reflect the expectation of future management changes. We are cautious about the 
result, given that previous studies found that Tobin’s Q is more susceptible to biases arising 
from accounting artifacts than ROA (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Further, King and Santor 
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(2008) uses a sample of Canadian family firms and observed that the organizational 
performance of the companies looked much better when ROA values are considered rather 
than Tobin’Q as a performance measure. In the context of a young firm, the market may not 
fully understand the future prospect of the firm, and may undervalue the firm. The 
inconsistent results of ROA and Tobin’s Q suggest that the relationship between market 
based and accounting based measures of young firms are unusual, potentially indicating that 
the situation is due to liability of newness of these young firms as they struggle to build 
healthy financial structures in the early stage of their life cycle. 
5. Extended analysis and robustness tests 
Here, we estimate the post-IPO performance over a two-year window in order to compare the 
results with existing studies such as Kroll et al. (2007) and Walters et al. (2010). Table 5 
reports the results. We find that the effect of original TMT members and original board 
members are positive and statistically significant at all conventional levels in all 
specifications. In addition, a direct comparison of Table 4 and 5 shows that the estimated 
coefficients on the proportion of original TMT members and proportion of original board 
members are statistically stronger than the results in Table 4. Our results  are consistent with 
Kroll et al. (2007) and Walters et al. (2010) who find that original TMT and board members 
have a positive influence on performance for young firms in the post-IPO period. Overall, our 
results are qualitatively similar to those we report in the paper with a five-year post-IPO 
period.  
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Table 5. Panel regression-Random effects of firm performance (ROA) on governance mechanisms plus controls 
for two years. 
This table presents the results from Panel regression-Random effects between firm performance (ROA) and governance variables. The 
sample consists of 80 observations from 40 young firms in Australia from 2002-2004. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. Year dummies are included but not shown. The asterisks *, **, and 
*** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable= ROA 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion of original TMT members 0.740*** 0.819** 0.826** 
   
  (0.268) (0.332) (0.398) 
   Proportion of original board members 
   
0.658 1.575** 1.625*** 
  
   
(0.500) (0.705) (0.576) 
TMT size 0.294 0.124 0.013 0.223 0.171 0.025 
  (0.194) (0.177) (0.165) (0.204) (0.158) (0.147) 
Board size 0.056 0.119 0.016 0.032 -0.004 0.189** 
  (0.106) (0.117) (0.081) (0.152) (0.135) (0.092) 
Non-exc. directors 0.162 -0.791 -0.872 -0.059 -0.579 -0.381 
  (0.786) (0.659) (0.559) (1.068) (0.846) (0.597) 
CEO duality 0.449* 0.586*** 0.541*** 0.393 0.654*** 0.721*** 
  (0.266) (0.176) (0.181) (0.335) (0.234) (0.179) 
Director age 
 
0.012 -0.021 
 
0.023 -0.016 
  
 
(0.021) (0.015) 
 
(0.018) (0.011) 
Firm size (Ln assets) 
  
0.327*** 
  
0.370*** 
  
  
(0.110) 
  
(0.087) 
Dividend payout ratio 
  
0.001 
  
-0.001 
  
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.003) 
Leverage 
  
-0.637** 
  
-0.275 
  
  
(0.285) 
  
(0.329) 
Firm risk 
  
0.196 
  
-0.420 
  
  
(0.992) 
  
(1.052) 
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes 
cons -2.068** -2.352** -2.716** -1.561 -2.982*** -3.385*** 
  (0.829) (1.100) (1.139) (1.003) (1.009) (0.897) 
N 80 53 50 80 53 50 
Chi-squared 31.03 26.67 83.03 23.38 22.79 136.1 
R-squared 0.17 0.24 0.58 0.12 0.32 0.6 
We examine whether our key findings are robust to some econometric issues related to 
multicollinearity and other issues. To check whether multicollinearity affects the result, we 
calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) for all variables in the study. As a rule of thumb, 
multicollinearity is likely to exist when the independent variables are highly correlated (i.e., r 
= 0.90 and above) or the VIFs for any of the variables exceed 10 (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
The average variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.01 and the highest for any regressors is 2.90, 
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which is well below the threshold indicator of 10. The results suggest a lack of evidence for 
multicollinearity between the variables.  
The results for operating performance are similar when estimating with pooled OLS.
5
 The 
key independent variables and control variables have the same sign and significance in each 
of the regression estimates on ROA as those reported earlier. This result confirms that the 
presence of original TMT and board members are beneficial for the performance of young 
firms.  
A key concern is that our results could be driven by reverse causality. It is possible that the 
poor performance of company is responsible for future changes in board and TMT structure. 
However, we argue that, the endogeneity issue may not be severe because during the early 
years of operation the young firms often have negative profitability (Reichstein, Dahl, 
Ebersberger, & Jensen, 2010). In the case of young firms, investors might be attracted mainly 
because of ex-ante or expected performance not because of ex-post performance. 
Nevertheless, we take steps to deal with this potential endogeneity problem. Following, 
Bennedsen, Kongsted, and Nielsen (2008), we re-estimate our specification in Appendix 
Table 8 using two-stage least squares. For simplicity of exposition, we report results only for 
specifications used in column III and VI of Table 4 and Table 7.  
We report the second stage of our IV estimation in Appendix Table 8. Columns I and III 
shows the second stage pooled OLS regression of ROA on original TMT membership, 
original board membership and board size, and all explanatory variables including year 
dummies and our instruments: 1-year and 2- years lagged of original TMT membership, 
original board membership and board size. The reason behind this is that board and TMT 
                                                          
5
Appendix Table 7 examines the relationship between changes in ownership structure on corporate governance 
mechanisms and operating performance changes on young firms using pooled OLS model. 
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membership variables in prior years could not have resulted from firm performance in 
subsequent years. Column II and IV shows the second stage of our firm Random-effect IV 
regressions of ROA on original TMT membership, original board membership and board size 
with 1-year and 2- years lagged of original TMT membership, original board membership 
and board size as the instruments for original TMT membership, original board membership 
and board size. All specifications include year dummies. 
The coefficient on original TMT membership, original board membership and board size are 
not significantly different from zero in either column. This is a common problem with IV 
estimation (Wooldridge, 2012). If endogeneity of original TMT membership, original board 
membership and board size are a serious problem in performance regressions for our sample, 
then we would have to rely on our IV-estimates, from which we would have to conclude that 
there is no relationship between ROA and original TMT membership, original board 
membership and board size. On the other hand, if endogeneity is not a serious problem, then 
we can rely on the OLS estimates. To test whether original TMT membership, original board 
membership and board size are correlated with the error term of the performance regression, 
we perform the Wu-Hausman F test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-sq test. The test statistic 
for the null that original TMT membership, original board membership and board size are 
uncorrelated with error term. We cannot reject the null.  
This suggests that once we control for the governance and firm characteristics in our 
regressions, as well as firm random-effects, endogeneity of original TMT membership, 
original board membership and board size due to reverse causality is not a serious concern in 
our performance regression, at least for young firms. 
Our conclusions depend critically on the quality of our instruments. Although we believe that 
our instrument is plausibly exogenous, we explore the hypothesis that change in board of 
28 
 
directors and TMT membership significantly affects firm performance. We reject that the 
models in columns II and V of Appendix Table 9 are under identified at the 1% level using 
the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic provided by ivreg2 in Stata, so our instruments appears 
relevant. However, the first stage robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistic are only 4.96 
and 4.11 respectively. Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend F-statistics of 10 in the first 
stage. Thus, our instruments are not as strong as we would like. We can also see from the 
output reported in Table 8, the exogeneity of the two instruments is respected (see p-value of 
Hansen J statistic). 
In summary, these results demonstrate that the presence of original boards of directors and 
top management members have a positive influence on firm value when an operating 
performance measure is used. However, those findings are not replicated when a market 
performance measure is used. The relationship between market based and accounting based 
measures in young firms are worthy of further exploration although this situation is beyond 
the scope of this study.  
6. Conclusion 
Organization theorists assert that the IPO is an important milestone for a company as it is the 
“re-birth” of the organization (see, e.g.Certo et al. (2009)) and IPO firms provide a unique 
opportunity to explore the link between two corporate governance mechanisms, namely TMT 
structure and board composition and their effect on post- IPO performance. This objective of 
this paper is to examine whether original board members and TMT members are beneficial to 
young firms performance at the post-IPO stage.  
Using Australian data for young firms over the period 2002-2007, our results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that corporate governance mechanisms have an impact on firm 
29 
 
performance following an IPO. Particularly, we find that both original TMT and board 
members have a positive effect on post-IPO performance. We also observe a strong positive 
relationship between the original TMT members and board members and post-IPO 
performance in the short-term period (i.e. two-year period). Overall, our study reveals that 
both original TMT and board members have a significant effect on both short term and long-
term IPO performance. Although similar results do not apply when the Tobin’s Q as a 
performance measure is also used, one plausible explanation is that market measure based on 
Tobin’s Q is very noisy measure of organizational performance for young firms as these 
firms suffer from liability of newness. This may also be why as these young firms become 
more established and the market player get to know them, their accounting and market based 
performance measures start to reveal similar results.  
These findings suggests that these firms due to their unique nature are in need of inputs, 
expertise and experience from inside board members and TMT members who possess 
relevant experience, firm-specific knowledge and expertise may also represent as an 
important source of competitive advantage. If they are still in place, they will continue to 
provide these resources. If new blockholders replace them, this process becomes more 
difficult and ultimately might have a negative consequences for firm performance.  
The findings of the papers matters to managers, investors, firms for several reasons. First, 
boards play a vital role in decision making over and above monitoring of executive actions by 
providing additional resources that firm TMTs might use to execute their strategies. Second, 
from the investor point of view, it is important to build a harmonious relationship with the 
original TMTs of IPO firms as they play an important role through crucial decision making 
for firm performance. 
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Appendix 
 
Table 6. Panel regression-Random effects of firm performance (Tobin’s Q) on governance mechanisms plus 
controls. 
This table presents the results from Panel regression-Random effects between firm performance (Tobin’s Q) and governance variables. The 
sample consists of 240 observations from 40 young firms in Australia from 2002-2007. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Robust 
Standard errors are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. Year dummies are included but not shown. The asterisks *, **, and 
*** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variable= Tobin's Q 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion of original TMT members -7.937 -0.969 -0.850 
   
  (6.336) (0.928) (0.954) 
   
Proportion of original board members 
   
-1.095 0.415 0.310 
  
   
(1.822) (1.434) (1.534) 
TMT size -2.790 -0.172 -0.216 -2.076 -0.017 -0.103 
  (2.891) (0.291) (0.288) (2.514) (0.309) (0.313) 
Board size -1.615 0.101 0.222 -1.752 0.065 0.191 
  (1.328) (0.227) (0.259) (1.412) (0.276) (0.314) 
Non-exc. directors -3.660 0.910 0.046 0.037 1.308 0.282 
  (9.863) (1.380) (1.245) (7.873) (1.097) (1.045) 
CEO duality 7.369* 0.732 0.614 7.245* 0.803 0.703 
  (4.127) (1.135) (1.133) (4.112) (1.133) (1.141) 
Director age 
 
0.007 0.042 
 
-0.010 0.026 
  
 
(0.070) (0.070) 
 
(0.070) (0.069) 
Firm size (Ln assets) 
  
-0.411 
  
-0.393 
  
  
(0.368) 
  
(0.377) 
Dividend payout ratio 
  
0.009 
  
0.007 
  
  
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) 
Leverage 
  
-0.035 
  
0.077 
  
  
(0.803) 
  
(0.787) 
Firm risk 
  
1.703 
  
2.086 
  
  
(2.472) 
  
(2.759) 
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes 
cons 24.198 1.541 3.445 17.056 0.815 2.708 
  (21.309) (3.203) (3.523) (16.713) (3.388) (3.947) 
N 240 154 150 240 154 150 
Chi-squared 4.347 21.9 25.84 4.547 21.21 18.9 
R-squared 0.08 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.05 
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Table 7. Pooled OLS regression of firm performance (ROA) on governance mechanisms plus controls. 
This table presents the results from Pooled OLS regression between firm performance (ROA) and governance variables. The sample consists 
of 240 observations from 40 young firms in Australia from 2002-2007. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Robust Standard errors 
are displayed in parentheses below the coefficients. Year dummies are included but not shown. The asterisks *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent variables= ROA 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Proportion of original TMT members 0.572*** 0.350** 0.218* 
   
  (0.212) (0.161) (0.128) 
   Proportion of original board members 
   
0.187 0.453** 0.371* 
  
   
(0.294) (0.219) (0.209) 
TMT size 0.402** -0.037 0.022 0.354* -0.023 0.040 
  (0.187) (0.117) (0.113) (0.189) (0.120) (0.114) 
Board size 0.215** 0.087 -0.001 0.225** 0.036 -0.058 
  (0.095) (0.061) (0.045) (0.102) (0.066) (0.049) 
Non-exc. directors 0.412 -0.526 -0.405 0.156 -0.445 -0.256 
  (0.701) (0.451) (0.464) (0.716) (0.461) (0.460) 
CEO duality -0.168 0.260 0.572*** -0.174 0.281 0.575*** 
  (0.230) (0.170) (0.156) (0.234) (0.173) (0.149) 
Director age 
 
0.004 -0.021* 
 
0.011 -0.018* 
  
 
(0.011) (0.011) 
 
(0.010) (0.011) 
Firm size (Ln assets) 
  
0.274*** 
  
0.283*** 
  
  
(0.058) 
  
(0.057) 
Dividend payout ratio 
  
0.002 
  
0.002 
  
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
Leverage 
     
-0.273 
  
     
(0.253) 
Firm risk 
  
0.066 
  
0.092 
  
  
(0.599) 
  
(0.596) 
Year dummies no yes yes no yes yes 
cons -2.828*** -0.950 -2.166*** -2.386*** -1.193* -2.276*** 
  (0.757) (0.651) (0.773) (0.757) (0.675) (0.750) 
N 240 154 150 240 154 150 
F-stat 6.985 1.736 5.959 5.457 1.688 7.836 
R-squared 0.13 0.119 0.365 0.104 0.116 0.39 
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Table 8. Instrumental Variable (IV) Regressions of firm performance (ROA) on governance mechanisms.  
Column I and III shows the second stage pooled OLS regression of ROA on original TMT membership, original board membership and 
board size, and all explanatory variables including year dummies and our instruments: 1-year and 2- years lagged of original TMT 
membership, original board membership and board size. Column II and IV shows the second stage of our firm Random-effect IV 
regressions of ROA on original TMT membership, original board membership and board size with 1-year and 2- years lagged of original 
TMT membership, original board membership and board size as the instruments for original TMT membership, original board membership 
and board size. Table 1 describes the sample and the control variables further. All specifications include year dummies. The Wu-Hausman F 
test and Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq tests (p-value in parentheses) statistic for the hypothesis that original TMT membership, original board 
membership and board size are uncorrelated with the error term of the performance regression is reported in the second last row. The 
asterisks *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  Dependent Variable= ROA 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Proportion of original TMT members -0.229 -0.224 
  
  (0.172) (0.218) 
  Proportion of original board members 
  
-0.210 -0.225 
  
  
(0.413) (0.350) 
TMT size -0.039 -0.036 0.0003 0.008 
  (0.075) (0.125) (0.126) (0.174) 
Board size 0.034 0.031 0.023 0.014 
  (0.102) (0.133) (0.144) (0.153) 
Non-exc. directors -0.034 -0.051 -0.116 -0.149 
  (0.342) (0.495) (0.397) (0.543) 
CEO duality 0.651*** 0.622*** 0.608*** 0.550** 
  (0.215) (0.212) (0.212) (0.214) 
Director age -0.016 -0.016 -0.020* -0.020 
  (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
Firm size (Ln assets) 0.215*** 0.214*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 
  (0.055) (0.070) (0.058) (0.078) 
Dividend payout ratio 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage -0.055 -0.052 -0.014 -0.009 
  90.272) (0.189) (0.253) (0.193) 
Firm risk -0.054 -0.033 0.189 0.191 
  (0.688) (0.877) (0.686) (0.846) 
Year dummies yes yes yes yes 
cons -1.388* -1.377 -1.350 -1.300 
  (0.800) (1.074) (0.868) (1.189) 
N 100 100 100 100 
First-stage-F statistics 46.24 
 
107.92 
 
  6.09  
7.63 
 Hansen J-test 0.650 
 
0.286 
 Chi-sq (df.) p-value in parentheses (0.722) 
 
(0.867) 
 Are Regressors exogenous? 
    Wu-Hausman F test 0.897 
 
1.027 
   (0.412) 
 
(0.362) 
 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-sq test 2.066 
 
2.360 
 
  (0.355) 
 
(0.307) 
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